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Abstract
This paper argues that banks must be sufﬁciently levered to have ﬁrst-best incentives to make new risky
loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking,
derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks
ﬁnance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the proﬁts. Second, banks
conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take
on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their
existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and ﬁnance companies have similar leverage
ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital
requirements as banks.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21; G32
1. Introduction
This paper calls into question a common benchmark in the literature, namely, that all equity-
ﬁnancedbankshaveﬁrst-bestincentivestotakeonrisks.Weargueinsteadthatall-equityﬁnanced
banks are inefﬁciently conservative in their credit decisions. Leverage is therefore beneﬁcial, at
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least up to a certain point, as it induces banks to take on more risks, thereby mitigating their
excessive conservatism.
Our theory of optimal bank leverage may help understand why ﬁnancial institutions, in con-
trast to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, are so highly levered. The argument we present is based on the role
of ﬁnancial institutions as providers of loans and is not mechanically linked to their role as de-
posit takers. This is important, for deposit-taking ﬁnancial institutions have substantial liabilities
over and above their deposit base, e.g., in the form of subordinated debt. For example, in 2000
commercial banks’ nondeposit liabilities (e.g., notes and bonds) accounted for 26.8 percent of
their total liabilities (Saunders and Cornett, 2003).
Our model builds on the model of informed lending by Inderst and Mueller (2006, 2007).
Two assumptions are key in that model. First, as banks do not own the projects in which they
invest, competition ensures that they cannot extract all of the proceeds from the project. Second,
banks are sophisticated lenders who conduct a credit risk analysis before originating new loans.
Similar to Stein’s (2002) notion of “soft information,” the loan ofﬁcer receives an informative
but non-contractible signal about the project to be ﬁnanced. Loan ofﬁcers, whose primary task is
to make informed credit decisions using their own judgment, can draw on personal experience
from making loans to similar ﬁrms in the past.1
Unlike this paper, the focus in Inderst and Mueller (2006, 2007) is on the contract design with
the borrower. Inderst and Mueller (2006) focus on the optimal security design in a setting with a
continuum of cash ﬂows, while Inderst and Mueller (2007) focus on the optimal use of collateral
in contracts with the borrower. In both papers, lenders are assumed to be all-equity ﬁnanced.
Hence, the issue of the lender’s own capital structure is ignored.
Since all-equity ﬁnanced banks are too conservative in their credit decisions, banks must
lever up sufﬁciently to have ﬁrst-best incentives to take on new risks. However, banks may take
on too much leverage and, consequently, engage in excessive risk-taking if they have access
to insured deposits without paying a fair premium. In fact, we show that irrespective of the
size of the insured deposit base, banks would always want to take on additional leverage. If
deposits are fairly priced, however, then imposing binding capital requirements makes banks too
conservative.2
Our model sheds light on some stylized facts in the banking literature. Most important, our
theory speaks to the question of why banks are so highly levered.3 This is puzzling for vari-
ous reasons. First, albeit many models assume a mechanical relationship between leverage and a
bank’s deposits, in practice banks typically take on additional debt over and above their deposit
base. Second, even the safety net provided by deposit insurance and informal guarantees can-
not fully account for their substantially higher leverage compared to non-ﬁnancial corporations.
While it is mainly large (money center) banks that beneﬁt from such a safety net, other ﬁnancial
1 The role of the loan ofﬁcer is emphasized by Saunders and Allen (2002, p. 9), who write that “the credit decision is
left to the local or branch lending ofﬁcer or relationship manager. Implicitly, this person’s expertise, subjective judgment,
and his weighting of certain key factors are the most important determinants in the decision to grant credit.”
2 We abstract from any externality a bank’s failure could have on the ﬁnancial system, in which case the normative
benchmark would have to be adjusted. See Bhattacharya et al. (1998) for a discussion of the different objectives of
banking regulation.
3 Flannery (1994, p. 321) notes that “ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ investment incentives are inﬂuenced by debt in the same way
as any other ﬁrm’s, yet they operate with unusually high leverage.” He reports an equity-to-asset ratio of 6.5% for
commercial banks in 1990 compared to a capital ratio of 55% for nonﬁnancial ﬁrms.R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314 297
intermediaries, such as ﬁnance companies, have similar capital ratios as banks do.4 Third, given
the opaqueness of ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ assets and their potentially greater ﬂexibility to make invest-
ments, one of the key disadvantages of leverage, namely, risk-shifting incentives, should weigh
especially strong for ﬁnancial ﬁrms (Kahn and Winton, 2004).
Our contribution is to provide a novel argument for why ﬁnancial institutions should indeed
have higher leverage than non-ﬁnancial institutions. Our argument rests squarely on a “functional
approach,” namely, that an important function of banks is to make risky loans in a competitive
environment.5
One limitation of our analysis is that we consider only one additional function of banks be-
sides providing funds, namely, to conduct a credit risk analysis. Other models have focused on
banks’ incentives to monitor and recollect outstanding loans to derive an optimal mix between
inside and outside ﬁnance (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996) or to explain the prevalence of (frag-
ile) deposit contracts (Diamond and Rajan, 2000).6 Moreover, while we allow for both insured
and uninsured deposits in our model, we merely treat them as another form of debt ﬁnance.
In contrast, Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991) focus on speciﬁc fea-
tures of deposit contracts, namely the sequential service constraint of demand deposits. Finally,
our rationale for debt ﬁnance is different from arguments in the corporate ﬁnance literature,
which typically link the choice of ﬁnancing to problems of effort provision or adverse selection.
(For applications to ﬁnancial intermediaries, see, e.g., Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986;
Williamson, 1986 and, more recently, Allen et al., 2008.)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
contains our main results. Section 4 presents comparative statics exercises. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
In our basic model, we consider a single lender (the bank) and a penniless ﬁrm (the borrower).
All parties are risk neutral. The borrower has an investment opportunity that requires a ﬁxed
capital outlay of k>0. The project generates either a zero cash ﬂow or a positive cash ﬂow
X>0. The success probability depends on the project’s type θ ∈ Θ ={ l,h} and is given by pθ.
Instead of investing in the borrower’s project, the bank can choose a safe investment opportunity,
which bears the interest r  0. Discounted with the interest rate r, the NPV of a type-θ project
is thus ηθ := 1
1+rpθX −k. Only a type-h project has strictly positive NPV.
Before making a loan, the bank conducts a credit risk analysis. Our model of credit risk
analysis follows Inderst and Mueller (2006, 2007). The credit risk analysis generates additional
valuable information, which we capture by a signal s ∈ S =[ 0,1]. A type-θ project generates
a signal s according to the atomless distribution function Fθ(s), which has a strictly positive
density fθ(s) over s ∈ (0,1) and satisﬁes fl(0)>0, fh(0) = 0, fl(1) = 0, and fh(1)>0. We
4 In 2000 the ratio of equity capital to assets for ﬁnance companies was 10.9 percent compared to 8.5 percent for
commercial banks (Saunders and Cornett, 2003). See also Dynan et al. (2002).
5 Diamond and Rajan (2000, p. 2431) also advocate a functional approach to banks’ capital structure: “Most work
on the subject extrapolates an answer from prior work on the capital structure of industrial ﬁrms. But bank assets and
functions arenotthe same asthose of industrial ﬁrms. [...]Therefore,toreallyunderstand thedeterminants of bankcapital
structure, we should start by modeling the essential functions banks perform, and then ask what role capital plays.”
6 Gorton and Winton (2003, p. 61) argue that these models are “...most applicable to small banks, where issuing
additional equity can substantially dilute top management’s stake in the bank. In a large bank such as Citigroup, even a
relatively small stock or option based stake can leave management with signiﬁcant risk in absolute terms, and it seems
less likely that issuing equity will signiﬁcantly affect top management’s’ incentive to monitor loans effectively.”298 R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314
specify that Fh(s) dominates Fl(s) in the sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD).
Based on the only privately observed signal, posterior beliefs are given by
(1) πθ(s) :=
πθfθ(s)
 
θ ∈Θ πθ fθ (s)
for θ ∈ Θ,
where from FOSD of Fθ(s) we have that πh(s) is strictly increasing in s. Together with ηl <
0 <η h this yields a unique threshold 0 <s FB < 1 at which the NPV (conditional on the observed
signal s) is just zero:
(2)
 
θ∈Θ
πθ(sFB)ηθ = 0.
It is therefore ﬁrst-best efﬁcient to approve the loan if s>s FB and to reject it is s<s FB.
The contract that is offered by the bank before observing s, stipulates repayment of the princi-
pal plus interest rB, though this will only occur in case of success.7 As noted in the Introduction,
s is supposed to capture the soft information and subjective judgment that inﬂuences a loan of-
ﬁcer’s credit decision, which is why the loan contract does not condition on.8 The bank’s offer
must also be sufﬁciently attractive to the borrower. More precisely, we require that the borrower’s
expected proﬁts from approaching the bank must not fall short of a strictly positive reservation
value V B > 0.
We ﬁnally turn to the bank’s own ﬁnancing decision. For our purpose, it is sufﬁcient to con-
sider only two different sources of ﬁnance for the bank: equity E and debt D, yielding total
funds of F := E + D. For simplicity, we stipulate that equity ﬁnance is provided by a single
(owner-manager) investor. Neither form of ﬁnancing is intrinsically cheaper as all investors have
the opportunity cost r. Though we next impose some restrictions on the bank’s ﬁnancing, we
will still be able to achieve the maximum feasible proﬁts for the bank. In this sense, these re-
strictions are without loss of generality. As both the bank and individual investors can realize
the safe return r, F is not uniquely pinned down. We specify that F = k. (One way to endoge-
nize this is to assume that there are some arbitrarily small costs of raising funds.) Given F = k,
the bank’s possible, veriﬁable cash ﬂow realizations are (i) y = k(1 + r) if no loan was made,
(ii) y = (1 + rB)k if a successful loan was made, and (iii) y = 0 if the loan went bad. The bank
promises debtholders to repay the principal D and the interest DrD, whenever this is feasible.
Consequently, equity has a levered stake with payout max{0,y−D(1+rD)}.
Though we specify that non-controlling investors receive a debt contract, in our model any
optimal contract would give the controlling investor a levered position. Restricting attention to
straight debt ensures that the incentives for risk-taking are fully captured by one variable, that is
the level of debt ﬁnancing D.
To summarize the description of the model, we (re-)state the various points on the timeline.
First, the bank decides on which share of k to raise through debt and which offers to make to
potential debtholders (rD) and a potential borrower (rB). If the bank secures ﬁnancing and if the
7 While we assume that there is commitment to the ex ante contract, contracts are also renegotiation-proof if s is the
bank’s private information. Note also that the bank cannot “buy” the project, which is a standard assumption in contract
theory. This assumption can be justiﬁed in our model by assuming that the credit risk analysis can also detect “ﬂy-by-
night operators” (Rajan, 1992; von Thadden, 1995), i.e., loan applicants without a real investment opportunity.
8 We could easily extend the model by introducing an additional veriﬁable signal, which could be incorporated into
the loan contract. Note also that under the chosen formulation the bank’s information is valuable as it can draw on its
expertise in ﬁnancing similar projects (see Manove et al., 2001). Consistent with this notion, Reid (1991) ﬁnds that
bank-ﬁnanced ﬁrms have higher survival rates than ﬁrms funded by family investors.R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314 299
borrower applies for a loan, the bank conducts the credit risk analysis and decides whether to
approve the loan.9 If the loan is approved, the investment is made and payoffs are realized, while
otherwise the investment is not undertaken.
3. Main analysis
3.1. The credit decision of an all-equity ﬁnanced bank
In analogy to the ﬁrst-best decision rule, the privately optimal credit decision of an all-equity
ﬁnanced bank (D = 0) follows again a cutoff rule. In case this cutoff is interior with 0 <s∗
E < 1,
it is deﬁned by the requirement that at s∗
E the bank is just indifferent between making the loan or
investing in the safe asset:
(3)
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
s∗
E
 
pθk(1+rB) = k(1+r).
It is convenient to specify that the bank approves the loan also in case of indifference, which is a
zero-probability event.
The higher the loan rate rB, the higher the likelihood that the loan is approved, i.e., the lower
the cutoff s∗
E in (3). As the borrower receives the residual payoff X−k(1+rB) in case a ﬁnanced
project was successful, the borrower’s participation constraint becomes
(4) VB :=
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ
 
s∗
E
  
pθ
1
1+r
 
X −k(1+rB)
 
 V B.
The bank’s program is now conceivably simple: Choose rB as high as possible while still
satisfying the borrower’s participation constraint (4).10 As V B > 0, the bank can not extract all
proﬁts from the investment, implying that k(1+rB)<X. As the bank provides, however, the full
investment outlay k, it consequently does not break even at the ﬁrst-best cutoff sFB. Optimally,
the bank then chooses a strictly higher cutoff s∗
E >s FB. Furthermore, the wedge between s∗
E and
sFB increases the lower is the loan rate rB, which in turn is the case the higher is the borrower’s
reservation value V B.
Proposition 1. The privately optimal credit decision of an all-equity ﬁnanced bank is too conser-
vative: s∗
E >s FB. Moreover, an increase in the borrower’s reservation value V B raises the cutoff
value s∗
E.
Proof. The result follows immediately from comparing (2) with (3). 
A distinctive feature of our model is that we consider the credit risk analysis as a key step in
the loan-originating process. Clearly, if the bank was not able to (privately) observe the signal s,
the “underinvestment” problem of Proposition 1 would not arise. Moreover, as the bank does not
own the project, it is natural to assume that V B is strictly positive, i.e., the borrower can extract
some of the proﬁts from the investment. (See also Section 4.) Otherwise, i.e., if V B = 0, the bank
9 In what follows, we focus on the equilibrium where there is no co-ordination failure between the borrower and the
bank’s providers of ﬁnance. That is, we rule out the trivial equilibrium where one side does not accept the offer simply
as it expects that also the other side does not accept.
10 Formally, the bank’s objective function is
 
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(s∗)][pθk(1+rB)−k]+
 
θ∈Θ πθFθ(s∗)k(1+r).300 R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314
could charge the borrower an interest rate such that k(1+rB) = X and would subsequently make
an efﬁcient credit decision.
3.2. Optimal capital structure
If a levered bank invests in the safe asset, the respective payoff to equity equals max{0,
k(1 + r)− D(1 + rD)}. If a loan was made but the project was not successful, the payoff is
zero. Finally, after ﬁnancing a successful project the payoff is max{0,k(1 + rB) − D(1 + rD)}.
For k(1+rB)  D(1+rD), equity would always realize zero, which we can safely rule out. The
bank then optimally approves a loan, given the signal s,i f
(5)
 
θ∈Θ
πθ(s)pθ max
 
0,k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)
 
 max
 
0,k(1+r)−D(1+rD)
 
.
We have the following result.
Lemma 1. The credit decision of a levered bank is characterized as follows:
(i) If
pl
 
k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)
 
 min
 
0,k(1+r)−D(1+rD)
 
,
then the bank always approves the loan.
(ii) If
ph
 
k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)
 
 min
 
0,k(1+r)−D(1+rD)
 
,
then the bank never approves the loan.
(iii) In all other cases, the bank approves the loan if s  s∗ and rejects it if s<s ∗, where
0 <s∗ < 1 solves
(6)
 
θ∈Θ
πθ(s∗)pθ
 
k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)
 
= k(1+r)−D(1+rD).
In a slight abuse of notation, we capture case (i) of Lemma 1, where the bank always ap-
proves the loan, by the cutoff signal s∗ = 0. Likewise, we capture case (ii), where the bank never
approves the loan, by the cutoff signal s∗ = 1.11
To attract debtholders’ funds, rD must satisfy their break-even constraint, which is the case if
their expected repayment, VD, satisﬁes
VD :=
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(s∗)
 
pθ
1
1+r
D(1+rD)
+
 
θ∈Θ
πθFθ(s∗)
1
1+r
max
 
D(1+rD),k(1+r)
 
(7)  D.
Taking into account the interest rates rB and rD, the value of equity is given by
VE :=
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(s∗)
 
pθ
1
1+r
 
k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)
 
11 Recall that the realizations s = 0a n ds = 1 are zero-probability events.R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314 301
(8) +
 
θ∈Θ
πθFθ(s∗)
1
1+r
min
 
0,k(1+r)−D(1+rD)
 
.
Recall next that the bank has now three choice variables: (i) the loan rate, rB, (ii) the interest
rate, rD, and (iii) what fraction of the total funds k are raised through debt, D. The bank’s
constraints are the participation constraint of the borrower (4) and the participation constraint of
debtholders (7). By optimality, the two constraints bind. Substituting the binding constraints (4)
and (7) into (8), we obtain
(9) VE −E =
 
θ∈Θ
πθηθ
 
1−Fθ(s∗)
 
−V B,
where we also used that E + D = k. Expression (9) is just a formal restatement of the fact that
equityistheresidualclaimant,appropriatingthefull“franchisevalue”ofthebank.Consequently,
from an ex ante perspective it would be optimal for the bank to make the ﬁrst-best credit decision:
s∗ = sFB.
As we already know from the analysis of the all-equity case, the bank’s ex post optimal credit
decision may, however, differ from the ex ante optimal decision. In case of a levered bank, in-
spection of (6) reveals that s∗ strictly decreases with the amount that is owed to debtholders,
i.e., with D and rD. To see why, observe ﬁrst that rD >r, i.e., that debtholders demand a risk
premium. This follows immediately from the debtholders’ break-even condition. From rD >r,
we next have immediately that
k(1+r)−D(1+rD)<E( 1+r),
implying that in a levered bank equity earns less than the (opportunity) costs of capital, r,i ft h e
bank invests in the safe asset. The higher is the promised repayment D(1+rD), the larger is this
wedge between the return from the safe asset and the cost of capital. This wedge constitutes a
countervailing force to the conservatism that we encountered with an all-equity bank. By ade-
quately choosing its capital structure, the bank can balance these two forces so that its privately
ex post optimal credit decision coincides with the ex ante optimal credit decision s∗ = sFB.
Proposition 2. The bank chooses a uniquely optimal level of debt D∗ > 0 so that its privately
optimal credit decision coincides with the ﬁrst-best optimal credit decision s∗ = sFB.
Proof. The result follows immediately from inserting the borrowers’ participation constraint (4)
and the debtholders’ break-even constraint (7) into (6). 
It is always possible to obtain s∗ = sFB as by scaling up D, we can gradually decrease the
bank’s residual payoff in case it does not make a loan, k(1 + r)− D(1 + rD), which makes it
increasingly unattractive to invest in the safe asset instead of making a loan. Formally, starting
from D = 0, which leads to some cutoff s∗ >s FB, we can continuously increase D and thereby
push down s∗ until reaching s∗ = sFB. Clearly, choosing an even higher leverage is not optimal.
By focusing on the function performed by sophisticated ﬁnancial intermediaries such as
banks, our approach may help to explain why ﬁnancial institutions have much higher leverage
than non-ﬁnancial corporations. In contrast to non-ﬁnancial corporations, ﬁnancial institutions
do not own the projects that they invest in. As we have seen in Proposition 1, this creates an
underinvestment problem in the sense that ﬁnancial institutions may be too conservative in their
lending decisions. By levering up sufﬁciently, which increases their incentives to take on risks,
ﬁnancial institutions can mitigate this underinvestment problem.302 R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314
4. Discussion
4.1. Regulation and deposit insurance
4.1.1. Bank capital regulation
Leverage and capital adequacy requirements are among the most prominent instruments of bank-
ing regulation. The Basle Accord of 1988 prescribes a minimum ratio between a bank’s capital
anditsrisk-weightedassets.12 Thisrequirementrepresentsonlyaminimumstandardandnational
regulators often impose additional requirements. For instance, the Bank of England watches
banks’ gearing ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of deposits and external liabilities to a bank’s capital
and reserves. Also, the conditions under which banks can participate in the deposit insurance
system are often contingent on banks’ capital base (e.g., as prescribed in the US by the FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991).
Ifregulatoryconstraintsforcebankstochoosealowerthanoptimallevelofleverage,thecredit
decision becomes inefﬁciently conservative. The proof of the following result is straightforward.
Corollary1.If regulatoryconstraintsforcethebanktochoosealowerthanoptimaldebtlevel,its
credit decision becomes inefﬁciently conservative. Precisely, given the constraint D  D<D ∗,
the bank’s optimal choice of debt is D. The lower is D, the greater is the gap between the bank’s
privately optimal cutoff s∗ and the ﬁrst-best cutoff sFB.
Corollary 1 shows that, next to curtailing banks’ (short-run) potential to make new loans,
binding capital requirements also have an indirect effect that follows directly from the main
result in this paper. While more stringent capital requirements make banks safer they will, if they
become binding, render the bank’s lending policy inefﬁciently conservative. The reduction in the
bank’s (expected) loan volume that is brought about by imposing a binding constraint D  D
is entirely due to the bank’s lower risk appetite. In particular, as equity and debt ﬁnancing are
equally expensive, varying the level of debt does not affect the overall costs of ﬁnancing.
4.1.2. Deposit insurance
Without regulation, the bank chooses just the right amount of leverage in our model. A key
assumption underlying this result is that the bank’s costs of funds fully reﬂect the (anticipated)
riskiness of its loan book. In what follows, we deviate from this assumption and allow the bank to
accessinsureddepositsuptosome(nottoolarge)limit d<k .(Forinstance, d maybedetermined
by the size of the bank’s retail network.)
The bank has now access to three sources of ﬁnance: insured deposits DI  d, non-insured
debt (e.g., non-insured deposits or subordinated debt) DN, and equity E. The respective interest
rates are denoted by rI
D and rN
D. For simplicity, we assume that deposit insurance covers both
the principal DI and the interest DIrI
D, implying that the costs of deposit ﬁnance do not respond
at all to the bank’s incentives to make risky loans. Also, we specify that insured deposits have
absolute priority. For simplicity, we also ignore any insurance premium that the bank would have
to pay when taking on insured deposits. What is important for our analysis is only that any such
premium would not fully reﬂect the true risk of deposits.
12 The bank’s capital base must reach at least 8% of total risk-weighted assets. Of this, 50% must be made up by core
(or “Tier 1”) capital, comprising mainly the bank’s equity capital.R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314 303
The characterization of the optimal credit policy, which we now denote by s∗
D, is fully analo-
gous to that in Lemma 1. The only difference is that in case of success, the bank must now pay
depositors the sum of DI(1+rI
D) and DN(1+rN
D). We next obtain for the value of equity
VE =
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ
 
s∗
D
  
pθ
1
1+r
 
k(1+rB)−DI 
1+rI
D
 
−DN 
1+rN
D
  
(10) +
 
θ∈Θ
πθFθ
 
s∗
D
  1
1+r
 
k(1+r)−DI 
1+rI
D
 
−DN 
1+rN
D
  
,
and for the break-even constraint of non-insured debt
V N
D :=
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ
 
s∗
D
  
pθ
1
1+r
DN 
1+rN
D
 
+
 
θ∈Θ
πθFθ
 
s∗
D
  1
1+r
max
 
DN 
1+rN
D
 
,k(1+r)−DI 
1+rI
D
  
(11)  DN.
Importantly, the interest paid on insured deposits, rI
D, does not depend on the anticipated
cutoff s∗
D. We specify that rI
D = r, though our results still hold as long as rI
D is not too high
compared to r. Substituting rI
D = r and rN
D from the break-even constraint (7), we obtain from
(11) that
(12) VE −E =
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ
 
s∗
D
  
ηθ −V B +
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ
 
s∗
D
  
(1−pθ)DI.
A comparison with (9) shows that the last line in (12) represents now the “gains” from raising
insured deposits that are not fairly priced. VE is now maximized at an inefﬁciently low cutoff
s∗
D <s FB, as can be seen from differentiating (12) with respect to s∗
D and evaluating the derivative
at s∗
D = sFB, which yields
(13) −
 
θ∈Θ
πθfθ(sFB)(1−pθ)DI < 0,
where for a type-θ loan the expected (discounted) transfer from the deposit insurance equals
DI(1 − pθ). At the optimal cutoff the sum of the NPV and the expected “subsidy” is zero. As
the bank will optimally choose DI = d, this is the case if
(14)
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
s∗
D
 
ηθ +d
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
s∗
D
 
(1−pθ) = 0.
Importantly, as long as V B > 0 holds, then regardless of the size of the bank’s insured deposit
base d it is clearly always optimal to take on additional non-insured debt. As noted in the Intro-
duction, this is consistent with stylized facts. If, as postulated in many models, leverage implied
excessive risk-taking, then, from an ex ante perspective, the bank would not want to take on ad-
ditional debt that is fairly priced. Summarizing next our discussion and inspecting (13) and (14),
we have the following result.
Proposition 3. If the bank has access to insured deposits, its credit decision under the optimal
debt level is inefﬁciently lenient: s∗
D = sD <s FB, where the cutoff sD is decreasing in the amount
of insured deposits d. Moreover, the bank always takes on additional non-insured debt over and
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4.2. Comparative statics
4.2.1. Loan market competition
The previous analysis has shown that the credit decision of an insufﬁciently levered bank is
too conservative, because some of the proceeds from the investment must be shared with the
borrower. This conservative bias is stronger the higher is the borrower’s reservation value V B,
which in turn is increasing in the degree of loan market competition. (If the bank is a monopolist
and has all the bargaining power, then V B = 0; otherwise it holds that V B > 0, where V B
increases as loan market competition becomes more intense. See Inderst and Mueller, 2006, 2007
for a model of loan market competition in which V B is endogenized along these lines.) If the
bank can freely choose its debt level, it will then optimally adjust its leverage to accommodate
changes in V B. The proof of the following result is straightforward.
Proposition 4. The optimal level of bank debt D∗ is strictly increasing in the borrower’s reser-
vation value V B, and thus in the intensity of loan market competition.
Proposition 4 also implies that the optimal leverage ratio, D/(V E +D), is increasing in V B.
This holds for two reasons. First, by Proposition 4 the optimal debt level increases with V B.
Second, an increase in V B implies lower net proﬁts for equity, VE − E (cf. expression (9)).
Consequently, the numerator (D) is strictly increasing in V B, while the denominator (VE + D)
is strictly decreasing.13
Proposition 4 has the following straightforward empirical implication.
Corollary 2. A decrease in the bank’s proﬁtability due to more intense loan market competition
leads to an increase in the bank’s optimal debt level and leverage ratio.
The negative association between proﬁtability and leverage, as postulated in Corollary 2, con-
trasts with the predictions of standard capital structure theories in corporate ﬁnance. Based on
the notion of ﬁnancial distress, it has been argued that more proﬁtable ﬁrms can sustain higher
levels of (tax-advantageous) debt ﬁnancing. In a recent study, Gropp and Heider (2006) exam-
ine the capital structures of 200 large banks. Consistent with Corollary 2, they ﬁnd that higher
proﬁtability is associated with lower leverage.
4.2.2. Leverage and risk-taking
Ifthefundamentalsofpotentialborrowers,aswellasthoseofthebank’sscreeningtechnology,
remain constant, then our model predicts that there should be no systematic relation between
leverage and risk-taking, at least not if the bank’s capital structure remains “in equilibrium.” To
illustrate this formally, we consider again the comparative statics in the degree of loan market
competition.
13 Interestingly, by looking at the market pressure from the “liability side” instead of the “asset side,” as in our model,
Flannery and Rangan (2004) paint a different picture than we do in Proposition 4. They argue that the capital build-up of
US banks in the 1990s was a response to more risk-sensitive pricing of banks’ own ﬁnancing. Incidentally, in an historic
perspective, the capital base of US banks has substantially eroded over the past decades. Along with other authors,
Berger et al. (1995) relate this to both explicit and implicit guarantees for banks’ depositors. According to Proposition 4,
a decline in banks’ capital ratios could also come from an increase in loan market competition.R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314 305
Note ﬁrst that the probability of loan default remains constant at
(15)
 
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(sFB)](1−pθ)
 
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(sFB)]
.
Likewise, using a different measure of riskiness that is commonly used in the empirical liter-
ature, the variation in the bank’s return to equity remains unchanged. To see this, note that the
realized return of an approved loan that is successful is
(16)
[k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)]−VE
VE
,
while if the bank invests in the safe asset, the return equals
(17)
[k(1+r)−D(1+rD)]−VE
VE
.
Furthermore, the realized return for an approved but ultimately bad loan is always −100%,
while by deﬁnition of VE the expected return to equity equals r. As leverage adjusts to ensure
that s∗ = sFB remains unchanged, we have from (6) in Lemma 1 that also the ratio
k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)
k(1+r)−D(1+rD)
remains unchanged.From theseobservations, it follows immediatelythat both(16) and (17)must
remain constant.
Corollary 3. If the bank’s leverage adjusts optimally to changes in loan market competition, then
both the bank’s loan default rate as well as the level and variance of returns to equity remain
unchanged.
While from Corollary 3 there should thus ceteris paribus not be a systematic relationship
between leverage and risk, such a systematic negative relationship can, however, arise if exoge-
nous changes relate to the fundamentals of projects or the bank’s screening technology. Before
showing this formally in the subsequent sections, it is convenient to relate this already now to the
extant literature.
Existing models as well as empirical evidence paint a mixed picture of the relationship be-
tween leverage and risk. It is probably fair to say that the prevalent view associates higher
leverage with more risk-taking (e.g., Flannery, 1989; Gennotte and Pyle, 1991). However, if
banks are hit by shocks that erode their capital base, and if asymmetric information makes it
costly to raise fresh equity (e.g., Stein, 1998), a negative correlation between leverage and the
creation of new loans arises. This holds, in particular, if the bank’s regulatory capital requirement
binds, and if the bank has a proﬁtable franchise (see Marcus, 1984).
Our perspective is different as we presume that leverage can adjust optimally and is thus
neither hard-wired to deposits nor too costly to change. If, as in Corollary 3, the borrower fun-
damentals remain unchanged, then we should expect no systematic relationship between lending
and risk-taking. In contrast, as we show next, we should expect a negative relationship if the em-
pirical analysis allows to distinguish among banks’ ability to make less risky loans, e.g., because
there is cross-sectional variation in the pool of potential borrowers or the banks’ ability to screen
borrowers. Empirically, a negative correlation is obtained by Demsetz et al. (1996) and, more
recently, by Gropp and Heider (2006), whereas Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) ﬁnd the opposite
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4.2.3. Access to borrowers with different risk proﬁles
We now allow for two payoffs xl and xh satisfying 0  xl <k<x h. We analyze the implica-
tions of raising the low payoff xl while keeping the mean ﬁxed by simultaneously lowering xh
(mean-preserving spread). Setting pl = 0, we thus require that xl and xh adjust jointly such that
xl(1−ph)+xhph remains constant.
As xl increases, the claim of the bank’s unsecured debtholders becomes less risky. Con-
sequently, unsecured debtholders will demand a lower risk premium rD − r. As we argued
previously, it is precisely this risk premium that exerts a countervailing force to the bank’s con-
servatism, which is why the optimal debt level has to increase. Given that the value of the bank’s
franchise, VE + D, remains constant under the considered mean-preserving spread, this also
implies that the bank’s leverage ratio, D/(D+VE), increases.
Proposition 5. As the bank’s borrower pool becomes safer, the bank’s optimal debt level and
leverage ratio increase.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
4.2.4. Variation in banks’ ability to screen borrowers
To obtain a continuous yet simple measure of the bank’s informational advantage vis-à-vis
other lenders, we assume it is now only with probability 0 <q 1 that the bank has a more
precise estimate of the borrower’s probability of success. Our previous analysis corresponds
to the case where q = 1, while changes in q capture changes in the bank’s ability to screen
borrowers.
As we want to allow for the case where q is close to zero, which reduces the value added that
the bank can generate through its more informative signal s,
 
θ∈Θ πθηθ clearly represents an
upper limit for the borrower’s reservation value V B. We thus set V B =
 
θ∈Θ πθηθ.14
Proposition 6. As the informativeness of the bank’s credit risk analysis improves, i.e., as q in-
creases, the bank’s optimal debt level increases. On the other side, as q approaches zero, the
optimal debt level remains bounded away from zero.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The intuition for Proposition 6 is straightforward. The more precise the bank’s information is,
the more certain can the bank’s debtholders be that a loan is given only if the success probability
is high. Consequently, for a given level of debt, the required risk premium rD − r decreases. To
ensure that the bank implements the efﬁcient credit decision in case it observes an informative
signal, it is then necessary to increase the debt level D.
4.2.5. Diversiﬁed versus focused loan portfolio
In our model, the bank can choose between a single risky asset, namely, a loan, and a safe
asset. This choice between a single risky asset and a safe asset is common to risk-shifting models,
including applications to banking.15 In banking, in particular, there is indeed much historical and
14 As shown in Inderst and Mueller (2007), V B can be generated from competing offers of other, non-informed lenders.
15 For example, Hellmann et al. (2000) assume that a bank can choose between a prudent asset, yielding some return α,
and a gambling asset, yielding an uncertain return equal to γ with probability θ and equal to β with probability 1 − θ.R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314 307
empirical evidence suggesting that risk-shifting is an important issue (e.g., the S&L crises in the
1990s). As banks hold large loan portfolios in practice, albeit not perfectly diversiﬁed ones, it
is important to check the robustness of our results for the case where the bank can make N>1
new loans.
Note ﬁrst that if the bank can make N>1 new loans, its optimal choice is to set a common
credit policy s∗ that is applied (e.g., by its loan ofﬁcers) to each simultaneous loan application.
The case where the N loans are perfectly positively correlated is trivial; the results are identical
to the single-loan case analyzed before. Consider therefore the other polar case where the N
loans are uncorrelated (in terms of realization of the underlying state θ).
Proposition 7. If the bank faces N>1 independent loan opportunities with uncorrelated
prospects, then, for all ﬁnite N, it remains optimal to raise strictly positive debt to implement
the efﬁcient credit policy s∗ = sFB.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
That s∗ = sFB is still optimal, regardless of N, is immediate given that the bank is the residual
claimant, once the binding constraints for borrowers and debtholders have been substituted into
the bank’s objective function. That positive leverage is necessary is also immediate as the choice
of N>1 does not fundamentally alter the basic “underinvestment problem” that makes the bank
too conservative in case D = 0 and V B > 0 hold. Finally, that s∗ = sFB is also feasible follows
intuitively from the observation that for very high leverage the bank will “overshoot” and become
too lenient with s∗ <s FB. To see this, take the extreme case where the total repayment obligation
D(1 + rD) is (arbitrarily) close to Nk(1 + rB). In particular, D(1 + rD) would then exceed the
sum of (N − 1)k(1 + rB) and k(1 + r). Consequently, banks’ equityholders would themselves
realize a positive payoff only if all N loans are approved (and ultimately successful).
As a comparative analysis of the optimal leverage in N proves too be rather intricate, we
conﬁne ourselves to a comparison of the single-loan case with the case where N = 2.
Proposition 8. The bank’s optimal leverage ratio is strictly higher for N = 2 independent loan
opportunities than if N = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
To understand why the banks’ leverage ratio increases when switching from N = 1t oN = 2,
note ﬁrst that (as formalized in Proposition 8) the efﬁcient credit policy s∗ = sFB, which the
bank implements via its choice of leverage, is not affected by N. This simpliﬁes the analysis,
as it implies that rB remains also unchanged. Recall next that the bank’s (additional) risk-taking
incentives due to leverage depend on the difference rD − r>0. Suppose the bank only raised
twice the amount of debt for N = 2 compared to what is optimal for N = 1, implying that
the leverage ratio would remain unchanged. Then, due to a standard “co-insurance” effect (cf.
Lewellen, 1971), debtholders would break even with a smaller rD. To then still ensure that the
On the other hand, some of the theoretical literature on banking rests on the notion that banks hold a well-diversiﬁed
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efﬁcient credit policy s∗ = sFB is implemented, the bank must raise more than twice the amount
of debt.16
To the extent that large banks have more diversiﬁed loan portfolios, Proposition 8 has implica-
tions for the relation between bank size and leverage. Accordingly, large banks should then have
higher leverage ratios than small banks, which seems to be consistent with much, though not
all, of the available empirical evidence (see Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004 for a recent study
of Italian banks). Of course, this may also follow from other reasons, including smaller banks’
higher costs of raising fresh capital.
There is also some evidence that large banks make riskier loans. Together with a higher lever-
age, this would seem to contradict the prediction in Proposition 5. However, what drives the
negative correlation between leverage and risk-taking in Proposition 5 is a (cross-sectional) dif-
ference in the pool of potential borrowers. Instead, large banks may differ in other aspects that
may explain why they take on more risk. For example, they may have more sophisticated risk-
management techniques, as in Demsetz and Strahan (1997).
5. Conclusion
We present a novel theory of banks’ optimal capital structure. We show how competition
for borrowers leads to an “underinvestment problem,” unless banks are levered up sufﬁciently.
Our key assumption is that banks are sophisticated lenders, who generate valuable information
when analyzing the creditworthiness of the borrower’s investment project. Absent regulatory
interference, banks choose the ﬁrst-best level of debt ﬁnancing. On the other side, banks lever up
excessively and over-expand their loan books in the presence of insured deposit ﬁnance without
adequately priced risk premium.
One of the key contributions of this papers is thus to question the presumption that without
regulation any positive leverage leads to excessive risk-taking by banks. In contrast, we show
that leverage is necessary to provide ﬁrst-best incentives for risk-taking. The paper also develops
a theory of optimal bank capital structure that is both speciﬁc to ﬁnancial institutions and that
is driven entirely by the bank’s function to make new risky loans. The ﬁrst feature is important
as it makes a qualitative difference between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial institutions, which could
in turn explain some of the differences in their respective leverage. The second feature is also
attractive as banks’ leverage does not seem to be completely hard-wired to their level of deposits.
We also show that, according to our theory, leverage should be positively correlated with the
degree of competition on the loan market and thus negatively correlated with their franchise
value. However, if banks optimally adjust their leverage then this should not have an impact on
their riskiness. Leverage adjusts only sufﬁciently so as to still ensure that banks have ﬁrst-best
incentives to take on risky loans.
16 It should be noted that, in our setting, the bank cannot invest more than k in a single project. Otherwise, by allowing
the bank to pick the best of two investment opportunities, the expansion of its business might more than double its overall
(franchise) value. Moreover, debtholders and equityholders would in this case always agree on the optimal allocation of
funds. This is different from Kahn and Winton (2004), where different subsidiaries of a conglomerate have different
risk-return proﬁles.R. Inderst, H.M. Mueller / J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 295–314 309
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5. From the deﬁnition of the ﬁrst-best credit decision it must now hold
that
(A.1) k(1+r)=
 
θ∈Θ
πθ(sFB)
 
pθxh +(1−pθ)xl
 
.
Observe next that in order to achieve s∗ = sFB, debt must be risky: D(1+rD)>x l. This allows
to still apply Lemma 1 for the deﬁnition of s∗. Rewriting the borrower’s participation constraint
(3) we also have that
(A.2) k(1+rB) =
 
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(s∗)]pθX −V B(1+r)
 
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(s∗)]pθ
.
Substituting (A.1) and the deﬁnition of s∗ from Lemma 1 into (A.2), we can then solve for
D(1+rD) = xl +
 
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
1−
 
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
(1+r)V B  
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(sFB)]pθ
.
This can ﬁnally be substituted into the break-even requirement of debtholders
D(1+r)= D(1+rD)
   
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(sFB)
 
pθ +
 
θ∈Θ
πθFθ(sFB)
 
+xl
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(sFB)
 
(1−pθ),
to ﬁnally
D(1+r)
= (1+r)V B
 
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
1−
 
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
 
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(sFB)]pθ +
 
θ∈Θ πθFθ(sFB)
 
θ∈Θ πθ[1−Fθ(sFB)]pθ
+xl.
Consequently, an increase in xl requires an increase in D by xl/(1+r). 
Proof of Proposition 6. We show ﬁrst that under the optimal contract the bank will approve the
loan if it does not observe an informative signal. This holds if
 
θ∈Θ
πθpθ
 
k(1+rB)−D(1+rD)
 
>k( 1+r)−D(1+rD),
which after substituting the deﬁnition of s∗ from Lemma 1 together with s∗ = sFB is satisﬁed in
case πh(sFB)>π h. This follows ﬁnally from V B =
 
θ∈Θ πθηθ > 0 and
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For general q, the participation constraint of borrowers becomes
 
θ∈Θ
πθpθ
 
1−qFθ(sFB)
  1
1+r
 
X −k(1+rB)
 
 V B =
 
θ∈Θ
πθηθ,
while the break-even requirement for debtholders becomes
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
qFθ(s∗)+pθ
 
1−qFθ(sFB)
   1
1+r
D(1+rD)  D.
By optimality these are satisﬁed with equality. Together with the deﬁnition of s∗ from Lemma 1,
we can stepwise solve out for rB and rD to ﬁnally obtain
D =
  
θ∈Θ
πθηθ
    
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
1−
 
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
   
θ∈Θ πθpθ +q
 
θ∈Θ πθFθ(sFB)(1−pθ)
 
θ∈Θ πθpθ −q
 
θ∈Θ πθFθ(sFB)pθ
 
,
which is thus strictly increasing in q. Finally, note that at the limit where q → 0 we obtain that
D =
   
θ∈Θ
πθηθ
    
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
1−
 
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ
 
> 0. 
Proof of Proposition 7. It is convenient to reformulate the bank’s program as follows. Suppose
the bank has chosen for n = 1,...,N−1 the symmetric standard s∗
n = s∗. We focus next on the
optimal choice of s∗
N. To derive the expected payoffs, we make the dependency on the parameters
ω = (n,m) explicit, where n will denote the number of approved applications (out of N − 1)
and m the number of ultimately successful projects. For the respective trinomial distribution we
obtain
ˆ ρ(ω):=
(N −1)!
(N −1−n)!m!(n−m)!
·
   
θ∈Θ
πθFθ(s∗)
 N−1−n   
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(s∗)
 
pθ
 m
·
   
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(s∗)
 
(1−pθ)
 n−m
,
while the respective payoff from the N −1 applications equals
  Π(ω):= (N −1−n)k(1+r)+mk(1+rB).
It is ﬁrst convenient to consider the case of an all-equity ﬁnanced bank such that
VE =
 
 
ˆ ρ(ω)
⎛
⎜
⎝
 
θ∈Θ πθFθ(s∗
N)
 
  Π(ω)+k(1+r)
 
+
 
θ∈Θ πθ
 
1−Fθ
 
s∗
N
  
(1−pθ)  Π(ω)
+
 
θ∈Θ πθ
 
1−Fθ
 
s∗
N
  
pθ
 
  Π(ω)+k(1+rB)
 
⎞
⎟
⎠.
Differentiating with respect to s∗
N yields
(A.3)
∂VE
∂s∗
N
=
 
 
ˆ ρ(ω)
⎛
⎜
⎝
 
θ∈Θ πθfθ
 
s∗
N
  
  Π(ω)+k(1+r)
 
−
 
θ∈Θ πfθ
 
s∗
N
 
(1−pθ)  Π(ω)
−
 
θ∈Θ πθfθ
 
s∗
N
 
pθ
 
  Π(ω)+k(1+rB)
 
⎞
⎟
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which can ﬁnally be transformed to obtain the ﬁrst-order condition
(A.4)
 
 
ˆ ρ(ω)
 
k(1+r)−
 
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
s∗
N
 
pθk(1+rB)
 
= 0.
Given quasiconcavity in s∗
N, we have from inspection of (A.4) a unique solution s∗
N >s FB as long
as k(1 + rB)<X . Introducing next positive leverage, we use   D := D(1 + rD). As previously,
we obtain ∂VE/∂s∗
N as in (A.3), which from symmetry and using total differentiation yields then
dVE/ds∗ = N(∂VE/∂s∗
N), evaluated at s∗
N = s∗. From this we subsequently obtain in analogy to
(A.4) the ﬁrst-order condition
(A.5)
 
 
ˆ ρ(ω)
⎡
⎣
max
 
0,   Π(ω)+k(1+r)−   D
 
−max
 
0,   Π(ω)−   D
 
−
 
θ∈Θ πθ
 
s∗
N
 
pθ
 
max
 
0,   Π(ω)+k(1+rB)−   D
 
−max
 
0,   Π(ω)−   D
 
 
⎤
⎦ = 0.
As regardless of ω the term in square brackets in (A.4) is strictly decreasing in s∗
N,w eh a v ef r o m
strict quasiconcavity of the objective function a unique solution for s∗
N. (Again, we have to ﬁnally
set s∗
N = s∗.)
From an ex ante perspective leverage is again optimally chosen so as to ensure that the ex
post optimal choice satisﬁes s∗ = sFB. (Formally, this is again obtained from substituting the
binding participation constraints for debtholders and the borrower into VE.) To see that a solution
0 <   D<Nk ( 1 + rB) exists at which (A.5) is satisﬁed for s∗ = s∗
N = sFB, we can substitute ﬁrst
for k(1+rB) fromtheborrower’sbindingparticipationconstraint(4),whichisindependentof N.
Observe next that the left-hand side of (A.5) is continuous in   D and from (A.4) strictly positive
at   D = 0. As for   D = Nk(1 + rB) it is exactly zero, it is sufﬁcient to show that for all   D in the
left-side neighborhood of   D = Nk(1+rB) (i.e., for   D = Nk(1+rB)−ε) it is strictly negative.
(Note also that for all   D<Nk ( 1+rB) the optimal cutoff s∗
N is indeed uniquely determined given
that, as noted above, the term in square brackets in (A.4) is strictly decreasing in s∗
N.) As in this
case the only positive term on the left-hand side of (A.5) is that where   Π(ω)= (N −1)k(1+rB)
and where, in addition, k(1 + rB) is realized from project N, the derivative w.r.t.   D is given by
ˆ ρ(ω)
 
θ∈Θ πθ(sFB)pθ > 0.
To ﬁnally compute from   D both D and rD, we can use   D = D(1 + rD) together with the
break-even constraint for borrowers. To write out the latter in the shortest possible way, deﬁne
for some ω = (n,m), where now 0  m  n  N,
Π(ω):= (N −n)k(1+r)+mk(1+rB)
as well as
ρ(ω):=
N!
(N −n)!m!(n−m)!
·
   
θ∈Θ
πθFθ(sFB)
 N−n   
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(sFB)
 
pθ
 m
·
   
θ∈Θ
πθ
 
1−Fθ(sFB)
 
(1−pθ)
 n−m
.
The binding break-even constraint then becomes
(A.6)
 
ω with 0mnN
1
1+r
min
 
Π(ω),  D
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Proof of Proposition 8. Denote by D∗ the level of debt ﬁnancing that implements the ﬁrst-best
credit decision if N = 1. Holding s∗ = sFB ﬁxed, note that the borrower’s participation constraint
and thus rB are independent of N. To show that D>2D∗ is optimal in case N = 2 we argue to
a contradiction. For this we suppose ﬁrst that D = 2D∗ and that debtholders would still assume
(wrongly) that the bank chooses s∗ = sFB.
We denote the interest rate at which debtholders break even originally by r∗
D. and by r∗∗
D the
corresponding interest rate for N = 2, D = 2D∗, and still s∗ = sFB. We show that r∗∗
D <r ∗
D.
Given that the argument involves some lengthy algebraic transformations, we restrict a detailed
analysis to the case where 2D∗(1 + r∗
D)  k(1 + r). The other feasible cases, where the “coin-
surance” effect is smaller but still present, are those where k(1+r)<2D∗(1+r∗
D)  k(1+rB)
and where 2D∗(1+r∗
D)>k( 1+rB).
For N = 1 we decompose VE into two terms such that VE(1+r)= A1−B1. Here, A1 denotes
the expected cash ﬂow to the bank, while B1 denotes the expected payoff to debtholders. While
generally we found it more instructive to work with the primitives of the model, namely the
distribution of types θ, it is now more tractable to introduce some additional notation. For this
we denote the ex ante distribution over the subsequently observed signals by G(s) with density
g(s) :=
 
θ∈Θ πθfθ(s) and the conditional success probability after observing s by p(s) :=  
θ∈Θ πθpθ. With this notational change, we now have
A1 = k(1+r)G(s∗)+k(1+rB)
 
1−G(s∗)
 
p∅,
where
p∅ :=
  1
s∗ p(s)g(s)ds
1−G(s∗)
.
Differentiation of A1 yields after some transformations that
dA1
ds∗ = g(s∗)k
  
p∅ −p(s∗)
 
−(rB −r)
 
,
while for B1 with
B1 = D∗ 
1+r∗
D
  
G(s∗)+
 
1−G(s∗)
 
p∅
 
we obtain
dB1
ds∗ = D∗ 
1+r∗
D
 
g(s∗)
 
1+p(s∗)
 
.
We can also use that
D∗ 
1+r∗
D
 
=
D∗(1+r)
1−(1−G(s∗))(1−p∅)
.
Turn now to the case with N = 2, where VE(1+r)= A2 −B2 with
A2 = k(1+r)
 
2G2(s∗)+2G(s∗)
 
1−G(s∗)
  
+k(1+rB)
 
2
 
1−G(s∗)
 2p∅ +2G(s∗)
 
1−G(s∗)
 
p∅
 
and
B2 = 2D∗ 
1+r∗∗
D
  
1−
 
1−G(s∗)
 2(1−p∅)2 
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After some transformations we have
dA2
ds∗ = 2g(s∗)k
  
p∅ −p(s∗)
 
−(rB −r)
 
and
dB2
ds∗ = 4D∗ 
1+r∗∗
D
  
1−G(s∗)
 
(1−p∅)g(s∗)
 
1+p(s∗)
 
,
while by deﬁnition of r∗∗
D we can also use that
D∗ 
1+r∗∗
D
 
=
D∗(1+r)
1−(1−G(s∗))2(1−p∅)2.
Note next that by construction we have that
(A.7)
dA1
ds∗ −
dB1
ds∗ = 0a t s∗ = sFB.
We show now that (A.7) implies at s∗ = sFB that dA2
ds∗ − dB2
ds∗ > 0 such that the ﬁrm must raise
more debt than 2D∗ so as to implement the efﬁcient credit policy. To show this, we have from an
immediate comparison of the respective terms that
dA2
ds∗ −
dB2
ds∗ = 2
 
dA1
ds∗ −z
dB1
ds∗
 
,
where
z =
2(1−G(s∗)(1−p∅)
1+(1−G(s∗))(1−p∅)
.
It thus remains to show that z<1, which follows as z is increasing in the expression (1 −
G(s∗))(1−p∅) and equal to one in case (1−G(s∗))(1−p∅) = 1. 
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